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WTO-COMPLIANT PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS: LESSONS FROM THE EU PRIVACYDIRECTIVE
CARLA L REYES*
Nation states often create legislative schemes regulating services industries in order to protect
fundamental rights such as human ife, economic security, or human security. World Trade
Organization members are constrained in their creation of such regulatory schemes by their
obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in Services ('GATS ). WTO members raised
concerns about such constraints even before the creation of GATS. As a result, GATS contains
clauses specifically designed to allow members enough regulatory latitude to protect important
domestic social interests, such as fundamental rights, while simultaneously liberalising trade
in services. WTO jurisprudence interpretingthese clauses, however, has called the robustness
of this reserved power into question. Using the European Union's attempt to protect the
fundamental right to privacy through a WTO-compliant privacy directive as a case study, this
article highlights important aspects of internationaltrade law that policymakers should take into
consideration when deciding how to protectfundamental rights through domestic regulation of
trade in services.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States props up the financial services industry with massive
inflows of public funds to maintain public order during the most extreme
economic crisis the world has experienced in half a century. The US, France and
the UK implement economic sanctions against Iran that reach further than those
authorised by the United Nations in order to insist that Iran curb its nuclear
proliferation program. As part of those sanctions, the three countries pass
legislation discriminating against the service industries of World Trade
Organization member states that continue to conduct business with Iran. These
measures are defended as necessary to protect human life or as necessary for the
protection of national security interests.
Arguably, economic security, human life and human security are each a
matter of fundamental rights which nation states are obligated to preserve and
protect for their citizenry. Because measures designed to preserve and protect
these rights often involve regulation of trade in services, nation states may be
constrained in their policy choices by commitments made as a member of the
WTO in the General Agreement on Trade in Services ('GA TS').I
GATS recognises the dual aims of achieving 'progressively higher levels of
liberalization of trade in services' and preserving 'the right of Members to
regulate ... the supply of services within their territories in order to meet national
policy objectives'. 2 However, in negotiating GATS, WTO members raised
concerns that because barriers to trade in services take different forms than
barriers to trade in goods, liberalisation would inhibit the enactment of domestic
regulations protecting important social interests. Despite GATS negotiators' best
attempts to provide members with regulatory latitude, schemes designed to
protect fundamental rights may risk violating important international trade
obligations. Even when a WTO member specifically relies on GATS exceptions,
the unpredictability of the exceptions analysis as implemented by the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body ('DSB') may leave the regulatory scheme at risk of
sanction.
This article uses the European Union's attempt to protect the right to privacy
through a WTO-compliant privacy directive to uncover lessons for future
initiatives to provide WTO-compliant protection of fundamental rights. Part II
provides an introduction to the EU Privacy Directive,3 investigates whether it is

I

MarrakeshAgreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,opened for signature 15
April 1994, 1869 UNTS 183 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex 1B ('General
Agreement on Trade in Services') ('GA TS').
2 Ibid Preamble.
3 Council Directive 95/46, on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processingof
Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data [1995] OJ L 281/31 ('Privacy
Directive'). The directive issued by the European Council 'shall be binding as to the result
to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods': Treaty Establishing the European
Community, opened for signature 25 March 1957, 298 UNTS 11 (entered into force I
January 1958) art 249, as amended by Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty of the
European Union, the Treaties Establishingthe European Communities and CertainRelated
Acts, opened for signature 2 October 1997 [1997] OJ C 340/1 (entered into force I May
1999).
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a GATS-covered measure and discusses the surrounding literature. Part III sets
forth arguments for the Privacy Directive's possible violation of the GATS'
most-favoured-nation ('MFN'), domestic regulation, and market access
obligations. Part IV examines whether the art XIV general exceptions provisions
adequately preserve WTO members' regulatory autonomy over issues of
fundamental rights. The article concludes by highlighting areas in WTO
jurisprudence that policymakers should take into consideration when crafting
future regulatory schemes.
II

GA TS AND THE PRIVAcYDIRECTIVE: BACKGROUND AND THRESHOLD ISSUES

A

The EU Privacy Directive

The right to privacy is a fundamental right in the EU. 4 In order to firmly
secure protection of this fundamental right, the EU has harmonised the level of
personal data protection in its member states with the Privacy Directive. The
Privacy Directive broadly defines personal data as 'any information relating to
an identified or identifiable natural person', where 'an identifiable person is one
who can be identified, directly or indirectly', 5 and imposes restrictions on the
processing and transfer of such data. In particular, art 25 prohibits the transfer of
personal data to third countries unless those countries provide an adequate level
of data protection. 6 If the EU determines that a particular country inadequately
protects data, EU member states must affirmatively prevent the transfer of
personal data to that country.7 The Privacy Directive does not define the term
'adequate' but instead provides that determinations should be made on a

4 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 222 (entered into force 3 September 1953), as
amended by Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 13 May 2004, CETS No 194 (entered into
force 1 June 2010) art 8; see also Virginia Boyd, 'Financial Privacy in the United States and
the European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Regulatory Harmonization' (2006) 24 Berkeley
JournalofInternationalLaw 939, 956.
5 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 2(a). In particular, when a person can be
identified 'by reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity' the data is personal.
The administrative body mandated to act as the data protection authority for the EU is the
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ('Working Party'): at art 29 (creating the Working
Party); see also at arts 30-1 (detailing the Working Party's responsibilities). The Working
Party has established a broad test for determining when information qualifies as personal
data, namely, that it be: (1) any information, (2) relating to, (3) an identified or identifiable,
(4) natural person: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 4/2007 on the
Concept of Personal Data' (Report WP 136, European Commission, 20 June 2007) 6-24
(detailing the specific requirements for meeting each of the four criteria).
6 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 25(1).
7 Ibid art 25(4); see also Paul M Schwartz, 'European Data Protection Law and Restrictions
on International Data Flows' (1995) 80 Iowa Law Review 471, 487.
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case-by-case basis. 8 In making adequacy determinations, the European
Commission is to consider 'all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer
operation or set of data transfer operations'.9
Although art 25 intended adequacy determinations to be made on an
individual basis,' 0 the Privacy Directive Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party ('Working Party') and the European Commission have recognised that the
growing volume of data transfers in international trade renders individualised
assessments for each transfer impossible." As a result, the Working Party has
undertaken a series of opinions on the general adequacy of third country data
protection regimes.1 2 These opinions are then submitted to the European
Commission, which has authority under the Directive to declare that a third
country generally provides adequate or inadequate protection.' 3 When issuing
opinions and adequacy determinations, the Working Party and the European
Commission analyse two components of foreign country law: (1) 'the content
of the rules applicable', 14 and (2) 'the means for ensuring their effective
application'.'5
Since the Privacy Directive's adoption in 1995, the European Commission
has determined that the laws of nine states maintain an adequate level of data

8 Gregory Shaffer, 'Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of US Privacy Standards' (2000) 25 Yale Journal of
InternationalLaw 1, 21.
9 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 25(2). In particular, the Commission is to
evaluate the following factors:
the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the proposed processing operation
or operations, the country of origin and country of final destination, the rules of law,
both general and sectoral, in force in the third country in question and the
professional rules and security measures which are complied with in that country.
10 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive' (Working Document WP
12, European Commission, 24 July 1998).
11 Ibid.
12 The Working Party undertakes its investigations at the request of the European Commission
at the beginning of what is referred to as the 'comitology procedure'. How the European
Commission chooses a country for an adequacy investigation is unknown.
13 PrivacyDirective [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 25(6).
14 For the purposes of evaluating the content adequacy of a foreign country's laws, the
Working Party has laid out required content principles: purpose limitation, data quality and
proportionality, transparency, security, rights of access, rectification and opposition, and
restrictions on onward transfers: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of
Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection
Directive', above n 10, 6. The Working Party also requires additional principles for three
specific types of data processing: sensitive data, direct marketing, and automated individual
decision: at 6-7.
15 Ibid 5. With regard to the adequacy of procedural and enforcement mechanisms, the
Working Party requires: (1) the ability to ensure a 'good level of compliance' through the
'existence of effective and dissuasive sanctions', (2) the provision of support and help to
individual data subjects through a rapid, effective and cost manageable 'institutional
mechanism allowing independent investigation of complaints', and (3) the availability of
appropriate redress through monetary compensation and other punitive sanctions when
appropriate: at 7.
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protection: the Bailiwicks of Guernsey 16 and Jersey,17 the Isle of Man, 18
Argentina,1 9 Switzerland, 20 and Hungary, 2 1The Faeroe Islands, 22 and Andorra. 23
The European Commission also decided that Israel provides an adequate level of
data protection as to automated international transfers of personal data, or where
non-automated transfers are subject to additional automated processing in
Israel. 24 And although the European Commission has not yet issued any
decisions, the Working Party determined that New Zealand 25 and Uruguay
ensure an adequate level of data protection. 26 Because the Working Party
specifically found that the US inadequately protects data, 27 the EU and the US
Department of Commerce negotiated the Safe HarborAgreement under which
voluntarily participating entities earn a presumption of adequacy. 28 Similarly, the

16 Commission Decision of2l November 2003 on the Adequate Protection ofPersonalData in
Guernsey [2003] OJ L 308/27, art 1.
17 Commission Decision of 8 May 2008 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data in Jersey
[2008] OJ L 138/21, art 1.
18 Commission Decision of 28 April 2004 on the Adequate Protection of PersonalData in the
Isle ofMan [2004] OJ L 151/48, art 1 ('Isle ofMan Decision').
19 Commission Decision of 30 June 2003 Pursuant to Directive 95/45/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate Protection of PersonalData in Argentina
[2003] OJ L 168/1, art 1.
20 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliamentand of the Council on the Adequate Protection of PersonalData Provided in
Switzerland [2003] OJ L 215/1, art 1.
21 Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate Protection of PersonalData Provided in
Hungary [2000] OJ L 215/4, art 1.
22 Commission Decision of 5 March 2010 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament andof the Council on the Adequate ProtectionofPersonalData Provided in the
Faeroe Islands [2010] OJ L 58/17, art 1.
23 Commission Decision of 19 October 2010 Pursuantto Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided in
Andorra [2010] OJ L277/27, art 1.
24 Commission Decision of3J January 2011 Pursuantto Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Adequate Protection of PersonalData by the State of
Israel with regardto Automated Processing of Personal Data[2011] OJ L 27/39, art 1.
25 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 11/2011 on the Level of Protection of
Personal Data in New Zealand' (Report WP 182, European Commission, 4 April 2011) 15
26 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 6/2010 on the level of protection of
personal data in the Eastern Republic of Uruguay' (Report WP 177, European Commission,
12 October 2010) 20.
27 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 10/2006 on the Processing of Personal
Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT)'
(Report WP 128, European Commission, 22 November 2006) 21.
28 US Department of Commerce, Safe Harbor Privacy Principles (21 July 2000) Export.gov
<http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eu/egmain_018475.asp> ('Safe Harbor Agreement').
The European Commission specifically determined that the level of data protection provided
by the Safe HarborAgreement ensures adequate protection 'for all the activities falling
within the scope of' the Privacy Directive when 'implemented in accordance with the
guidance provided by the frequently asked questions ... issued by the US Department of
Commerce on 21 July 2000': Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive
95/46/2000/520/EC of the European Parliamentand of the Protection Provided by the Safe
Harbor Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US
Department of Commerce [2000] OJ L 215/7, art 1.
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Working Party determined Canada potentially lacked adequate data protection, 29
causing the European Commission to adopt a sector-by-sector approach to
adequacy determinations in that country. 30 The Working Party also refused to
grant Australia a general adequacy finding, stating instead that 'data transfers to
Australia could be regarded as adequate only if appropriate safeguards [are]
introduced', such as those contained in Privacy Directive art 26.3' This is
essentially equivalent to an inadequacy finding, and Australia has not yet
negotiated a safe harbour agreement or other significant partial arrangement. 32
Data transfers to the countries about which no adequacy determination has
been made are not prohibited, but rather, transfers continue in the absence of any
guidance. 33 As a result, the national data protection authorities of each member
state retain the responsibility to individually review transfers to such countries
under one of the two administrative procedures open to them in art 25: prior
authorisation or ex post facto verification. 34 However, the Working Party
recognises that the large number of daily data transfers will render detailed
examination of every case impossible under either procedure. 35 As a result, the
adequacy provision in Privacy Directive art 25 creates a patchwork system of
international data transfer, where some countries receive a general pass, others
must negotiate for specific agreements, and still others operate in a middle area

29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive', above n 10, 26.
30 Specifically, the European Commission found that Canada, while not generally meeting the
adequacy standard, provides adequate data protection in the field of Canadian commercial
activities: Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliamentand of the Council on the Adequate Protection of PersonalData
Provided by the Canadian Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act
[2002] OJ L 2/13, art 1. Furthermore, with regards to processing and transfer of 'advance
passenger information' and 'passenger name record data' between airline carriers and the
Canada Border Services Agency, the EU negotiated an agreement providing exemptions to
compliant entities: Council Decision of 18 July 2005 on the Conclusion of an Agreement
between the European Community and the Government of Canada on the Processing of
API/PNR Data [2006] OJ L 82/14, annex.
31 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 3/2001 on the Level of Protection of the
Australian Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000' (Report WP 40, European
Commission, 26 January 2001) 6.
32 Australia does have an agreement with the EU regarding passenger name record data - a
very narrow exception to an otherwise complete inadequacy finding. See Council Decision
of 30 June 2008 on the Signing, on Behalfof the European Union, of an Agreement between
the European Union and Australia on the Processing and Transfer of European
Union-Sourced Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the Australian
Customs Service [2008] OJ L 213/47.
33 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive', above n 10, 27.
34 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 25.
35 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive', above n 10, 26.
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without knowing whether their domestic privacy protection regime will survive
an adequacy determination. 36
B

Is the Privacy Directive a Measure Covered by GATS?

Although trade in services had not historically formed part of the agenda for
international trade liberalisation, policymakers approached the Uruguay Round
in the 1980s with a new appreciation for the important role services play in the
modern global economy.37 Their negotiating efforts at the Uruguay Round
resulted in GA TS, which provides a unique framework for WTO member
obligations in services sectors. 38 Under GATS, a member only obligates itself to
provide market access and national treatment in those sectors which it has listed
in its 'schedule of specific commitments', and even then, only to the extent
indicated by the schedule. 39 Essentially, members are free to choose the extent to
which they are obligated to liberalise trade in services with respect to market
access and national treatment. 40
The threshold issue for an analysis of the Privacy Directive under GA TS is
whether it is a GATS-covered measure. Canada- Autos dictates that:
two key legal issues must be examined to determine whether a measure is one
'affecting trade in services': first, whether there is 'trade in services' in the sense
of art 1:2; and, second, whether the measure in issue 'affects' such trade in
services within the meaning of art 1:1.41
GATS defines 'trade in services ... as the supply of a service' in one of four
modes of supply: 42 cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial

36 Notably, there are also possible exceptions to the general prohibition on transfers of
personal data to countries with inadequate data protection under the Privacy Directive:
Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 26. However, the Working Party interprets these
exceptions very narrowly, so that it is difficult to ascertain when third countries may rely on
the exceptions in making particular transfers: see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
'Working Document on a Common Interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of
24 October 1995' (Working Document WP 114, Working Party, 25 November 2005) 7
(noting that exceptions from a general rule 'must be interpreted restrictively'). For example,
data transfers for the purpose of discovery in trans-border litigation are particularly
problematic and there is an ongoing debate regarding when transfers for discovery purposes
fall within the exceptions. For a detailed analysis of the US discovery-EU Privacy
Directive conflict and a review of the surrounding literature, see Carla L Reyes, 'The US
Discovery-EU Privacy Directive Conflict: Constructing a Three-Tiered Compliance
Strategy' (2009) 19 Duke JournalofComparative andInternationalLaw 357.
37 Panagiotis Delimatsis, InternationalTrade in Services andDomestic Regulations: Necessity,
Transparency,andRegulatory Diversity (Oxford University Press, 2007) 11.
38 For a succinct and readable explanation of the GATS framework, see generally Trade in
Services Division, World Trade Organization Secretariat, A Handbook on the GATS
Agreement (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
39 Bernard Hoekman, 'The General Agreement on Trade in Services' in John H Jackson,
William J Davey, and Alan 0 Sykes Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic
Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of
TransnationalEconomic Relations (Thompson West, 5 h ed, 2008) 942, 944.
40 Ibid 946.
41 Appellate Body Report, Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WTO Doc WT/DSl39/AB/R, WT/DS/142/AB/R, AB-2000-2 (31 May 2000) [155]
('Canada-

42 GA TS art I:2.

Autos').
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presence and movement of natural persons. 43 The first prong of the
Canada- Autos test thus involves two separate inquiries: first, whether there is
a service at issue, and second, whether the service occurs via one of the four
modes of supply in art 1:1.
To address the first inquiry under the Canada- Autos test, whether there is a
service at issue, WTO members often rely on the GATS Service Sectoral
Classification List ('W/1]20') and the UN Provisional Central Product
Classification ('CPC') for categorising activities as goods or services.44 Under
W/120, data processing activities are classified as being in the computer sector,
under art 1:1(B)(c) - 'data processing services'. 45 Under the CPC, 'on-line
information and/or data processing services' fall in the computer-related services
sector. 46 The EU specifically recognises that online data processing is part of the
computer services sector. 47

43 Ibid art 1:2(a)-(d); see also Trade in Services Division, World Trade Organization
Secretariat, above n 38, 5.
44 Shin-Yi Peng, 'Trade in Telecommunications Services: Doha and Beyond' (2007) 41
Journal of World Trade 293, 293 n 1:
Although optional, most Members follow the W/120 classification system, whose
160 sub-sectors are defined as aggregates of the more detailed categories contained
in the United Nations provisional Central Product Classification ('CPC'). Thus CPC
categories help clarify the scope of the commitments actually undertaken under the
GA TS, and most Members list the corresponding CPC numbers when scheduling
their GA TS commitments.
45 GATS Services Sectoral ClassificationList, WTO Doc MTN.GNS/W/120 (10 July 1991)
(Note by the Secretariat) 2 ('W/120').
46 W/120, WTO Doc MTN.GNS/W/120, 3 citing United Nations Statistics Division,
Provisional Central Product Classification, UN Doc ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/77 (1991)
(' CPC').
47 Classification in the Telecom Sector under the WTO-GATS Framework, WTO Doc
TN/S/W/27, S/CSC/W/44 (10 February 2005) (Communication from the European
Communities) ('EC Telecom Classification').At this juncture, it is appropriate to note that
there exists some debate in the literature regarding a possible mode of supply problem for
intemet services thought to be covered by GATS. The debate is significant enough that it
merits a brief discussion here, using the EU as a test case. It has been argued that under the
W/120 classification, data processing may fall under either the telecommunication services
sector or the computer-related services sector: Peng, above n 44, 298. However, the EU
stipulated that data processing forms part of the computer-related services sector: EC
Telecom Classification, WTO Doc TN/S/W/27, S/CSC/W/44. In its schedule of
commitments, the EU has listed 'none' in both Mode I and Mode 2 for data processing
services ('2(B)(c)') corresponding to the computer-related services sector ('CPC 843')
heading: European Communities and Their Member States: Schedule of Specific
Commitments, WTO Doc GATS/SC/31 (15 April 1994) 32 ('EU Schedule'). The EU failed
to alter these listings despite four subsequent revisions to its schedule: see The European
Community and Its Member States: Schedule of Specific Commitments - Supplement 1,
WTO Docs GATS/SC/31/Suppl.1 (28 July 1995); European Community and Its
Member States: Schedule of Specific Commitments - Supplement 2, GATS/SC/3 1/Suppl.2
(28 July 1995); European Communities and Their Member States: Schedule of Specific
Commitments Supplement 3, GATS/SC/31/Suppl.3 (ll April 1997); European
Communities and Their Member States: Schedule ofSpecific Commitments - Supplement 4,
GATS/SC/3 1/Suppl.4 (26 February 1998).
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The second inquiry under the first prong of the Canada - Autos test is
whether the service occurs via one or more of the four modes of supply in art 1:2.
The dearth of WTO disputes arising under GATS results in few definitions of the
modes of supply; however, the panel in Mexico - Telecoms confirmed that
cross-border services can encompass services which begin on one nation's
telecommunication network and terminate on another's. 48 Data processing, a
computer service, often takes place remotely, beginning on one nation's internet
network and terminating on another. Given the finding of Mexico - Telecoms,
data processing certainly falls within the cross-border supply mode of services.
Furthermore, several commentators acknowledge that services provided via
e-commerce will fall into either the cross-border or the consumption abroad
mode of supply. 49 E-commerce transactions necessarily involve the transfer of
individual personal information such as IP addresses, 50 shipping addresses, and
credit card information. Therefore, to the extent e-commerce involves the
provision of computer related services, those services would fall into both the
cross-border and consumption abroad modes of supply. With the possibility that
services involving the transfer, processing, and storing of personal data fit within
two modes of supply, the first component of the Canada - Autos test is
Furthermore, there is some indication that even if the EU schedule had differentiated
between Mode I and Mode 2 in the Data Processing Services sector, analysis of the
legislative and administrative history surrounding the Privacy Directive would resolve the
issue without altering the EU's expectations. The PrivacyDirective itself indicates that it is
concerned with regulating the 'cross-border flows of personal data': Privacy Directive
[1995] OJ L 281/31, Preamble para 6. The Working Party has also consistently described
the Privacy Directive as being applicable to cross-border processing of personal data:
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines' (Report WP 148, European Commission, 4 April 2008) 11;
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Working Document on Determining the
International Application of EU Data Protection Law to Personal Data Processing on the
Internet by Non-EU Based Sites' (Working Document WP 56, Working Party, 30 May
2002) 7-9. Finally, if the Privacy Directive did not regulate cross-border supply of data
processing services, the art 25 adequacy determinations would neither be necessary for the
EU nor objectionable to other WTO members. This author expects that, upon closer
examination, other 'modes of supply problems' would similarly dissipate.
48 Panel Report, Mexico - Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WTO Doc
WT/DS24/R (2 April 2004) [7.45] ('Mexico- Telecoms').
49 Maria Ver6nica P6rez Asinari, 'The WTO and the Protection of Personal Data: Do EU
Measures Fall within GATS Exception? Which Future for Data Protection within the WTO
E-Commerce Context?' (Paper presented at 18th BILETA Conference: Controlling
Information in the Online Environment, London, 2003), noting that the cross-border and
consumption abroad modes of supply 'would certainly involve e-commerce examples'. See
also Metka Stare, 'The Scope for E-Commerce in Central European Countries' Services
Trade' (2003) 23 Service Industries Journal 27, 29 ('the main issue is whether e-commerce
in services should be treated as mode I or as mode 2').
50 IP addresses fulfil the four-pronged test for personal data set forth in the Privacy Directive:
see Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Working Document: Processing of Personal
Data on the Internet' (Working Document WP 16, Working Party, 23 February 1999) ('The
use of the infrastructure is often directly based on the processing of personal data, such as
certain Internet Protocoladdresses' (emphasis added)); Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party, 'Working Document: Privacy on the Internet - An Integrated Approach to On-Line
Data Protection' (Working Document WP 37, Working Party, 21 November 2000) 11
('Internet Access Providers usually seem to systematically "log" the date, time, duration and
dynamic IP address given to the Internet user in a file. As long as it is possible to link the
logbook to the IP address of a user, this address has to be considered as personal data'). For
more on the development of IP addresses as personal data under the Privacy Directive, see
Joseph Cutler and Carla Reyes, 'Was That Your Computer Talking to Me? The EU and IP
Addresses as "Personal Data"' (2008) 13 Cyberspace Lawyer 1.
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satisfied: the Privacy Directive regulates trade in services within the meaning of
art 1:2.
The second prong of the Canada - Autos test requires an examination of
whether the Privacy Directive 'affects' trade in the types of services
identified - services related to e-commerce and information processing
services. The term 'affecting' in GATS reflects the intent that the agreement be
given a broad reach.5' The Appellate Body has repeatedly relied upon the
ordinary meaning of the term 'affecting', holding that it 'implies a measure that
has "an effect on"'. 52 In the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ('GATT) 5 3 art III, the Appellate Body has determined that it is 'wider in
scope than such terms as "regulating" or "governing"'.54 The Privacy Directive,
by its own terms, is meant 'to ensure that the cross-border flow of personal data
is regulated in a consistent manner'. 55 As the term 'affecting' encompasses
'regulating', and the Privacy Directive is a measure adopted by the EU for the
purpose of regulating data processing, which is a part of the computer-services
sector, the Privacy Directive 'affects' trade in services within the meaning of art
1:1 of GATS, and satisfies the second prong of the Canada- Autos test.
C

GATS and the Privacy Directive: A Conflict?

Since its adoption in 1995, commentators have been concerned with the
possibility that the Privacy Directive violates WTO obligations. The EU itself
seemed preoccupied with this possibility when adopting the Privacy Directive,
noting in the preamble that 'cross-border flows of personal data are necessary to
the expansion of international trade [and] this Directive does not stand in the way
of such trade'.56 As early as 1999 Gregory Shaffer argued that despite the US'
threats to challenge the PrivacyDirective before the WTO, the EU would prevail
for two primary reasons: (1) the Privacy Directive is not facially discriminatory,
and thus does not violate the national treatment or MFN clauses of GATS; and
(2) the Privacy Directive would be covered by art XIV(c)(i). 57 Professor
51 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Autos,WTO Doc WT/DSl39/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R,
[158], quoting Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale andDistribution of Bananas, WTO Doc WT/DS27/ABIR, AB- 1997-3 (9
September 1997) [233] ('EC -Bananas III').
52 Ibid.
53 Marrakesh Agreement Establishingthe World Trade Organization,opened for signature 15
April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995) annex IA ('General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994') ('GATT').
54 Appellate Body Report, Canada- Autos, WTO Doc WT/DSI 39/AB/R, WT/DSl42/AB/R,
[158], quoting Appellate Body Report, EC - Bananas III, WTO Doc WT/DS27/AB/R,
[233].
55 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, Preamble para 8 (emphasis added).
56 Ibid Preamble para 56.
57 Gregory Shaffer, 'The Power of EU Collective Action: The Impact of EU Data Privacy
Regulation on US Business Practice' (1999) 5 European Law Journal419, 425-6. GA TS art
XIV reads:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement
by any Member of measures: ... (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement
including those relating to: ... (ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in
relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of
confidentiality of individual records and accounts ...
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Shaffer's analysis, however, does not address the specific requirements of the
national treatment clause, the MFN clause and the general exceptions set out in
WTO jurisprudence. Furthermore, Professor Shaffer's observation that the
Privacy Directive is not facially discriminatory and is thus WTO-consistent has
been rendered moot by the Directive's subsequent uneven application58 and the
Appellate Body finding in US - Gambling that discriminatory application is
covered by GATS provisions in addition to facial discrimination. 59
Colin J Bennett challenges Professor Shaffer by noting that his argument rests
on predictions that are impossible to verify, 60 and counters with his own
predictions that not only would the MFN clause of GATS art II be implicated, but
that art VI:1's provisions on domestic regulations are also relevant. 61
Unfortunately, while noting that art VI:1 applies only to measures of general
application and only in sectors for which members have undertaken specific
commitments, Professor Bennett does not discuss whether the EU has made
specific commitments in the services sector covering data processing, or whether
the Privacy Directive constitutes a measure of general application.
Eric Shapiro delves into a much deeper substantive analysis of the Privacy
Directive vis-a-vis EU-WTO obligations, arguing that either Hungary or
Australia could bring allegations before the WTO DSB because the EU had
favoured the US by creating the Safe Harbor Agreement, while continuing to
hold Hungary and Australia to the higher standards contained in the Privacy
Directive.62 Shapiro focuses, however, on the MFN clause, setting aside possible
violations of the domestic regulation and market access provisions. 63
Furthermore, the suggestion that Hungary's challenge to the Privacy Directive
under the MFN clause would prevail is problematic, since Hungary received a
favourable adequacy determination, which actually gives it a more preferential
status than the US.
As can be seen from this brief review of the prior literature analysing whether
the Privacy Directive is GATS-compliant, commentators intuitively believe the
Privacy Directive violates WTO obligations, but will be justified by the
exceptions. However, most of the literature was written early in the Privacy
Directive's existence, and engages in analysis without the benefit of subsequent
Working Party reports and European Commission adequacy determinations.
Further, analysis of the Privacy Directive and the EU's GATS obligations was
undertaken prior to US - Gambling, the first thorough treatment of GA TS

58 See generally above nn 11-35.
59 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Betting and Gambling Services, WTO Doc WT/DS285/ABfR, AB-2005-1 (7 April 2005)
('US - Gambling'); see below Part Ill. Although Professor Shaffer makes identical
arguments and predictions in an article published in 2000, his analysis contains the same
difficulties: Shaffer, 'Globalization and Social Protection', above n 8, 46-55.
60 Colin J Bennett, 'Information Policy and Information Privacy: International Arenas of
Governance' [2002] Journalof Law, Technology and Policy 385, 405.
61 Ibid 404.
62 See generally Eric Shapiro, 'All Is Not Fair in the Privacy Trade: The Safe Harbor
Agreement and the World Trade Organization' (2003) 71 FordhamLaw Review 2781.
63 Ibid 2783.
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obligations by the Appellate Body.64 After the decision, scholarly literature
emerged arguing that the result of the dispute highlights several important
problems with GATS. One critique argues that the unique GATS use of specific
commitments for market access and national treatment obligations results in
misunderstandings among member states, even as to the nature of their own
schedule of commitments. 65 A second critique focuses on the unpredictable
nature of exceptions analysis undertaken by the Appellate Body. 66 In particular,
it remains unclear when a measure proven to be for one of the specifically listed
reasons under GATS art XIV will survive the 'necessary' test 67 or satisfy the
requirements of the chapeau. 68 For example, the Appellate Body imported the
'necessary' test in US - Gambling69 from Korea - Beef,70 a GATT case, in
spite of a WTO Secretariat paper warning that the term 'necessary' may not
retain the same meaning in every WTO-covered agreement. 71 Thus, it is
important that an analysis of whether the Privacy Directive is GA TS-compliant
be revisited to account for the new developments in both the EU administration
of Privacy Directive art 25 adequacy determinations and WTO jurisprudence.
The outcome of such an analysis has implications for policymakers seeking to
implement regulatory schemes protecting other areas of fundamental rights, and
can provide important lessons for future endeavours.
64 In that dispute, Antigua and Barbuda brought a complaint against the US alleging that 18
USCA § 1084 (2011) ('the Wire Act'), 18 USCA § 1952 (2011) ('the Travel Act') and 18
USCA § 1955 (2011) ('the Illegal Gambling Business Act') violated GATS obligations: at
[114]. The Appellate Body found that the US made specific commitments in its schedule
regarding gambling and betting services; that the three challenged measures provided less
favourable treatment than committed to in the schedule; and that, as a result, the US was in
violation of its GATS art XVI:2 obligations on market access: at [373]. The Appellate Body
further found that the measures did not fall within the public morals exception of GATS art
XIV(a) because they failed to conform with the chapeau: at [370]-[372]. A second case
decided by a WTO Panel, Mexico - Telecoms, did involve certain questions of GATS
interpretation, but focused most centrally on the Annex on Telecommunications and the
interpretation of country Reference Papers, rather than on GA TS obligations and member
schedules: see Panel Report, Mexico - Telecoms, WTO Doc WT/DSO24/R.
65 Federico Ortino, 'Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in
US - Gambling: A Critique' (2006) 9 JournalofInternationalEconomic Law 117, 119-32.
Specifically, Ortino argues that the US - Gambling report's reliance on the common
intentions of the member states raises 'serious concerns of certainty, stability and security':
at 147; see also Douglas A Irwin and Joseph Weiler, 'Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285)' (2008) 7 World Trade Review 71, 73.
66 Irwin and Weiler, above n 65.
67 For a discussion of the 'necessary test' see below Part III(A)(1).
68 The chapeau of GA TS art XIV reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services
69 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [305].
70 Appellate Body Report, Korea - MeasuresAffecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled andFrozen
Beef WTO Doc WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, AB-2000-8 (11 December 2000)
[ 164] ('Korea - Beef).
71 GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to Article XX, Paragraphs(b), (d) and
(g) of GATT, WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/53/Rev.1 (26 Octoberl998) (Note by the
Secretariat - Revision) [42] ('SecretariatNote on Article XX'); see also Irwin and Weiler,
above n 65, 107, arguing that the Appellate Body's use of the necessity test in
US - Gambling leaves out an important aspect of the Korea - Beef test, rendering it more
unpredictable.
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POSSIBLE PRIVACYDIRECTIVE VIOLATIONS OF GA TS

By enacting the Privacy Directive, the EU may have violated three separate
GATS obligations: the MFN obligation of art II, the requirements for domestic
regulations in art VI and the market access obligations of art XVI. Although
appearing facially non-discriminatory, the EU Working Party's guidelines and
opinions setting forth the proper application of the Privacy Directive give cause
for greater concern. Furthermore, the Working Party's shift from adequacy
determinations of individual transfers to adequacy determinations in relation to
countries, without delineating proper timelines or application procedures for all
WTO member countries, creates a potential art VI violation. Finally, because of
the commitments the EU made in its GATS schedule, art 25 adequacy
determinations implemented on a country-by-country basis may constitute a zero
quota in violation of art XVI.
A
1

Article II: The MFN Obligation

Introduction to the MFN Obligation ofArt I

The MFN obligation is designed to discourage WTO members from granting
special treatment to third countries. 72 It is thought that when countries enact
discriminatory trade preferences, the most efficient market suppliers may be
blocked from the market, resulting in 'wasteful trade diversion'. 73 Reflecting this
economic theory, the MFN obligation of art II applies 'generally to all measures
covered by GATS irrespective of the question whether an MFN obligation has
been inscribed in a Member's Schedule'. 74
Although modelled after the MFN obligation contained in GATT art 1:1,
GATS art II has a wider scope than its GATT counterpart. 75 The Appellate Body
in Canada - Autos set forth the test for establishing a violation of art II:
compare the treatment afforded by one member to services and service suppliers
of any other member with the treatment of like services and service suppliers of
any other country.76 This comparison should be undertaken with a view to
determining whether the first group received less favourable treatment than the
second group. 77 That test leaves two issues unresolved: (1) what constitutes 'like
services and service suppliers', and (2) what constitutes 'no less favourable'
treatment? As to the first issue, the determination of like services, it is unclear
whether the inquiry must be to the likeness of both services and service
72 Rtadiger Wolfrum, 'Article II GATS: Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment' in Rtadiger
Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feindugle (eds), WTO: Trade in Services
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 71, 76.
7 Kevin Kennedy, 'GATT 1994' in Patrick Macrory, Arthur Appelton and Michael Plummer
(eds), The World Trade Organization:Legal, Economic and Political Analysis (Springer,
2005) vol 1, 89, 100.
74 Wolfrum, above n 72, 72.
75 Ibid 74, noting that GATT art 1:1 applies only to 'customs duties, methods of levying such
duties, rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and matters
referred to in Art 111:2 and 111:4 GATT 1994', while GATS art 11applies to 'any measure
covered by the agreement'.
76 Appellate Body Report, Canada-Autos, WTO Doc WT/DSl39/AB/R, WT/DSl42/AB/R,
[171].
77 Ibid; see also Wolfrum, above n 72, 80.
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suppliers, or if only the likeness of the service supplied is relevant. 78 However,
the panel in EC - Bananas III held 'that, in [their] view, at least to the extent
that entities provide these like services, they are like service suppliers',
suggesting that only the likeness of the service is relevant. 79
As to the second issue, the concept of 'no less favourable' treatment is not
borrowed from GATT art 1:1, but rather from the GATT national treatment
obligation.80 As a result, WTO member states are unable to rely on the rich
GATT jurisprudence interpreting this term in order to understand GATS art 11:1.
In fact, the Appellate Body in EC - Bananas III confirmed that the meaning of
the phrase in GATS art 11:1 is different from its meaning in GATT art 111:4, and
that prior jurisprudence interpreting the phrase in that context is 'not necessarily
relevant to the interpretation of art II of GATS'. 81 The Appellate Body did
provide some guidance on the meaning of the term, indicating that GATS art II
addresses both de jure and de facto discrimination. 82 This has lead many to
question whether the only way to satisfy the GATS MFN obligation is to provide
exactly the same treatment to each state. 83
2

An MFN Analysis of the Privacy Directive

To be successful, a GATS art II challenge to Privacy Directive art 25
adequacy determinations must prove that the EU has afforded the services and
service suppliers of one WTO member treatment less favourable than that
afforded to the like services and service suppliers of another country. 84
Hypothetically, Australia, which received a negative adequacy determination,
could challenge the Privacy Directive art 25 adequacy determinations on two
separate grounds. First, Australia could argue that Australian data services and
service suppliers have been afforded less favourable treatment than the like data
services and service suppliers from other countries with Working Party
determinations of inadequate data protection standards, such as the US and
Canada.85 Secondly, Australia could argue that Australian data services and
service suppliers have been afforded less favourable treatment than like data
78 Wolfrum, above n 72, 85.
79 Panel Report, EC -Bananas III, WTO Doc WT/DS27/R/USA (22 May 1997) [7.346].
80 In fact, the language 'no less favourable' is used in the national treatment articles of both the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947 and GATS: General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (entered into force 1
January 1948) art 111:4 ('GATiT 1947') ('The products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment
no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin'). GA TS art II:1
reads:
With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each Member shall accord
immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other
Member treatment no less favourable than it accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country.
81 Appellate Body Report, EC-BananasIII, WTO Doc WT/DS27/AB/R, [231].
82 Ibid [233].
83 Wolfrum, above n 72, 88.
84 GATS art II; see also above nn 74-8 and accompanying text.
85 At the time of writing, negotiations between the EU and Australia for an Australian safe
harbour were underway. If this should come to pass, this argument would no longer be valid
for Australia, but would be valid for another country deemed to lack adequate data
protection standards under Privacy Directive art 25.
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services and service suppliers from those countries for which adequacy remains
undetermined. 86
In both arguments, Australia must demonstrate the likeness of Australian data
processing services and service suppliers. The Privacy Directive places
restrictions on all services involving data processing, and prohibits transfers of
personal data to any service supplier in a country with inadequate data protection
standards, like Australia. Practically speaking, this means that an
Australian-based search engine processing personal data for the purposes of
providing user-customised internet information services is prohibited from
receiving transfers of personal data from the EU, while the US-based Google
could receive such transfers under the Safe Harbor Agreement, despite the fact
that they are like search engines providing the same customised internet
information services. The same could be said for an Australian-based Internet
Service Provider ('ISP') as compared to a South Korean-based ISP which
provide exactly the same services.
Under the EC - Bananas III test, which focuses on the likeness of the
services under the traditional GA TT rubric, a search engine's end use is to find
information on the internet, regardless of the country in which the entity is based.
Search engines fall under the same service sector classification of 'on-line
information and database retrieval' in W/120 and CPC 7523, irrespective of
nationality, and the properties and nature of search engines do not vary
significantly enough to negate their likeness.87 This is supported by the fact that
the EU considers all search engines to be sufficiently similar so as to be
uniformly subject to the requirements of the Privacy Directive, rather than
providing entity specific applications of the Privacy Directive.88 Given this
analysis, an Australian challenge based on denial of transfers to search engines
would certainly withstand the EC - BananasIII likeness test.
As to ISPs, these entities would satisfy the first factor of the EC - Bananas
III test because the end use of an ISP's service is to help the internet user
interface with website content providers on the internet, regardless of the origin
of the ISP. As to the other factors, all ISPs fall under the same service sector
classification -

data transmission services in CPC 752389 -

and their

properties and nature do not vary enough from ISP to ISP to negate the first two
factors. A finding that ISPs provide 'like' services is supported by the fact that
the EU uniformly applies the requirements of the Privacy Directive to ISPs
rather than providing for entity-specific application of its provisions. 90
Having established the likeness of services and service suppliers that might be
implicated in a dispute regarding Privacy Directive art 25 adequacy
86 Regardless of whether the current negotiations for an Australian safe harbour are successful
or not, Australia will retain the right to raise this second challenge, as safe harbour
provisions (such as those between the US and EU) are more onerous than the free pass
afforded to countries that have not yet undergone adequacy determinations. As a result, this
argument also remains a viable option for the US and Canada.
87 W/120, WTO Doc MTN.GNS/W/120,3 citing CPC, UN Doc ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/77.
88 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 1/2008 on Data Protection Issues
Related to Search Engines', above n 47.
89 CPC, UN Doc ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M/77.
90 See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Working Document: Privacy on the
Internet - An Integrated Approach to On-Line Data Protection, above n 50, 21-3.
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determinations, the inquiry now turns to whether Australia has been afforded
treatment less favourable with respect to those services than other countries. The
Privacy Directive intended case-by-case approval for all transfers to third
countries regarding whether the data protections surrounding that specific
transfer were adequate. Such a system would have provided uniform treatment
to each and every transfer, and stripped Australia, the hypothetical complainant,
of its GATS art I claims. However, the country-by-country adequacy
determinations instituted by the Working Party and the European Commission to
replace the transfer-by-transfer adequacy determinations is susceptible to two
separate claims of 'treatment less favourable': (1) countries deemed inadequate
by the Working Party and European Commission receive less favourable
treatment than inadequate countries which negotiated safe harbours or other
partially-adequate arrangements, and (2) all inadequate and partially-adequate
countries, including those with safe harbour arrangements, receive less
favourable treatment than those nations for whom no adequacy determination has
been made.
In the first scenario, Australia's challenge rests on the fact that similarly
situated countries receive safe harbour or partially-adequate arrangements while
Australia remains barred from receipt of personal data transfers from the EU,
effectively shutting its services and service suppliers out of the EU market.
Given the Appellate Body's determination in EC - BananasIII that GATS art II
addresses both de jure and de facto discrimination, some have argued that only
identical treatment can satisfy the provision. 9 1If true, the difference in treatment
between the US, Canada and Australia certainly constitutes less favourable
treatment. Even if the 'no less favourable' treatment standard does not require
identical treatment, the purpose of MFN obligations is to ensure that no WTO
member receives more burdensome treatment than other countries in the same
service sector. Australia's inadequacy finding operates to prohibit all transfers of
personal data to entities based in Australia. This is certainly more burdensome
than the treatment afforded to the US, despite its inadequacy finding, through the
Safe HarborAgreement. The PrivacyDirective fails to satisfy either meaning of
the term 'no less favourable' treatment.
In the second scenario, Australia's challenge rests on the fact that not all
countries have been subjected to the requirements of Privacy Directive art 25 to
the same extent. Only 14 adequacy determinations have been undertaken since
the Privacy Directive's enactment. That leaves the other 149 countries outside
the EU free to flout the art 25 prohibition. Article 25 facially prohibits transfers
going to a country without a positive adequacy determination, whether because
an investigation actually revealed the data protection standards there are
inadequate or because no investigation has yet been undertaken. However, the
country-by-country adequacy scheme was undertaken precisely because that
facial requirement was ineffective, allowing many transfers of personal data to
third countries without adequate protection standards. Countries that have not yet
undergone an adequacy investigation continue to operate under the old scheme,
which the EU recognises is easily evaded.

91 See above nn 80-3 and accompanying text.
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The failure of the EU Commission and the Working Party to undertake
adequacy determinations of every country thus constitutes treatment less
favourable to those countries subjected to the process and found inadequate.
Other countries with similarly inadequate data protection standards routinely
receive data transfers under the old system while Australia receives none,
Canada receives transfers in certain sectors but not others, and the US receives
transfers only under the Safe Harbor Agreement. Necessarily, this fails the
'identical treatment' understanding of the MFN provision. It also fails the 'no
treatment more burdensome' understanding of the MFN provision, as services
and services suppliers in Australia, Canada and the US are certainly more
burdened than those countries that would fail an adequacy determination if one
was undertaken, but which have not yet undergone an investigation. This
analysis reveals that, in fact, the Privacy Directive art 25 adequacy
determinations may be in violation of GA TS art II.
B
1

92
Article VI: Domestic Regulations

Introductionto Art VI on Domestic Regulations

Article VI: 1 requires that measures of general application are applied in a
reasonable, impartial and objective manner. This requirement aims to improve
the consistency and predictability of administrative decisions by preventing the
93
arbitrary and biased application of measures to foreign service suppliers. It is
important to note that art VI: 1 applies only to measures of general application, a
term for which WTO jurisprudence provides two complementary definitions:
measures affecting 'an unidentified number of economic operators' 94 and
measures covering 'a range of situations or cases, rather than being limited in
their scope of application'. 95 The panel has held that art VI:1 embodies the

92 GA TS art VI captures those regulations which are neither discriminatory on their face nor
market restrictive in the traditional sense, but which nevertheless impede trade in services.
There are six sub-sections in art VI. Of those, arts VI:4-5 apply only to measures for which
it could not reasonably have been expected that the time specific commitments would be
listed in the schedules. As the Privacy Directive was enacted just one year after the listing of
the EU's specific commitments (the Privacy Directive was enacted in 1995 and the EU
schedule was submitted to the WTO in 1994, when GA TS became effective), it could have
reasonably been expected that the time specific commitments would be listed in the EU
schedule. This renders a discussion of these provisions beyond the scope of this article.
Instead, this section will focus on an analysis of art VI: 1-3 and art VI:6 by first introducing
the provisions, and then providing an analysis of the Privacy Directive under each provision.
93 Panagiotis Delimatsis, 'Due Process and "Good" Regulation Embedded in the
GATS - Disciplining Regulatory Behaviour in Services through Article VI of the GATS'
(2007) 10 JournalofInternationalEconomic Law 13, 28.
94 Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Underwear,WTO Doc WT/DS24/R (9 November 1996) [7.65] ('US - Underwear'); see
also Appellate Body Report, US- Underwear,WTO Doc WT/DS24/AB/R, AB-1996-3 (10
February 1997) [21].
Selected Customs Matters, WTO Doc
95 Panel Report, European Communities WT/DS315/R (16 June 2006) [7.116] ('EC - Selected Customs Matters'). The Appellate
Body has further clarified that GATT art X: 1's reference to 'of general application' is not
meant to include specific transactions or specific shipments: Appellate Body Report,
European Communities - MeasuresAffecting the Importation of CertainPoultry Products,
WTO Doc WT/DS69/AB/R, AB-1998-3 (13 July 1998) [111], [113].

158

Melbourne JournalofInternationalLaw

[Vol 12

principles of consistency and predictability, which inform interpretation of the
other paragraphs of art VI. 96
Article VI:2 requires WTO members to establish or maintain procedures for
reviewing administrative decisions affecting trade in services. Although GATS
does not require that the procedure take any specific form, to satisfy the
requirement of art VI:2, the reviewing body must have the authority to
review both the underlying facts and the legal determinations made by the
administrative agency. 97 When a service supplier is required to receive
authorisation to engage in trade, art VI:3 requires administrative agencies to keep
the supplier informed of the status of the application and communicate any
decision within a reasonable time. In US - Gambling, the panel pointed out that
art VI:3 provides transparency and due process.98 Article VI:6 requires that
procedures for verifying professional competence be available in professional
services sectors. Notably, arts VI:A, VI:3, and VI:6 apply only to sectors of
services for which a WTO member has made specific commitments.9 9 This
aspect of the domestic regulation provisions in GATS is different from its
counterpart in GATT art X, which applies to all the measures specified therein.100
2

An Art VI Analysis of the Privacy Directive

The Privacy Directive might be vulnerable to challenge under the obligations
of arts VI: 1 and VI:3. First, the Privacy Directive is a measure of general
application, rendering it subject to the provisions of art VI: 1. The Privacy
Directive is not limited in its scope of application, but rather, applies to all
transfers and processing of personal data. Accordingly, the Privacy Directive
covers 'a range of situations or cases' as required by the EC - Selected Customs
Matters test. 101 Although the Privacy Directive only applies to personal data,
rather than all data, Privacy Directive art 2(a) defines personal data very
broadly, 102 so that the range of situations or cases to which the Directive applies
is not meaningfully limited. In fact, the Working Party has interpreted the
definition of personal data to encompass everything from telephone numbers to
intemet protocol addresses. 103 As a result, the definition of personal data does
not render the Privacy Directive any less a measure of general application, as it
remains possible to say that the Directive applies to 'an unidentified number of
96 Panel Report, EC- Selected Customs Matters, WTO Doc WT/DS315/R, [7.431] n 742.
97 Markus Krajewski, 'Article VI GATS: Domestic Regulation' in Radiger Wolfrum,
Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feindugle (eds), WTO: Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff,
2008) 165, 173-4.
98 Panel Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R (10 November 2004) [6.432].
99 See GATS arts VI:l, VI:3, V1:6. See also Delimatsis, above n 37, 97.
100 Delimatsis, above n 31, 97.
101 See above nn 95-6.
102 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 2(a):
'personal data' shall mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person ... an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.
103 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal
Data', above n 5, 12-4, 16-7.
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economic operators'.1 04 Secondly, the EU has made specific commitments in the
data processing services sector, specifically listing 'none' for Mode I and Mode
2.105 As a result, the Privacy Directive is subject to the provisions of arts VI: 1,
VI:3 and VI:6, at least with regard to cross-border supply and consumption
abroad.
The literature suggests two competing standards for analysis under art VI: 1.
Under the first standard, art VI:1 imposes a substantive proportionality
requirement through the concept of 'reasonableness'. 106 In discussions relating to
GATS art VI:4, a proportionality requirement is thought to mean that the
requirements imposed by the measure cannot be disproportionate to the objective
pursued.10 7 The test often 'requires a balancing exercise between the trade
restrictiveness of a measure and the policy objective'.1 08 In this case, the
objective of the Privacy Directive adequacy determinations is to secure
compliance with the protections for personal data secured by the rest of the
Privacy Directive.109 Clearly, the protection of a right such as privacy in
personal data is an important objective.11 0 However, the art 25 prohibition on
transfers to inadequate third countries is the most restrictive means available for
achieving this objective, and the EU has used less restrictive means, such as the
Safe HarborAgreement or partial-adequacy determinations. As a result, the EU
may face difficulty in overcoming an art VI: 1 challenge under this standard.
Under the second suggested standard, art VI: 1 only applies to the
administration of the Privacy Directive."'l Even under this less stringent
obligation, the Privacy Directive, as actually administered, also faces significant
difficulty. The Privacy Directive facially requires that adequacy determinations
be administered on a transfer-by-transfer basis,"l 2 however, the Working Party
and European Commission apply a country-by-country administrative approach
instead, claiming that the original scheme proved unworkable for national data

104 Thus fulfilling the US - Underwear standard: see Panel Report, US - Underwear,WTO
Doc WT/DS24/R [7.65].
105 EU Schedule, WTO Doc GATS/SC/31, 32.
106 Joel P Trachtman, 'Lessons for the GATS from Existing WTO Rules on Domestic
Regulation' in Aaditya Mattoo and Perre Sauv6 (eds), Domestic Regulation and Service
Trade Liberalization(Oxford University Press, 2003) 66; Joel P Trachtman, 'Negotiations
on Domestic Regulation and Trade in Services (GATS Article VI): A Legal Analysis of
Selected Current Issues' in Ernst-Ulrich Petersman (ed), Reforming the World Trading
System - Legitimacy, Efficiency, and Democratic Governance (Oxford University Press,
2005) 205, 211.
107 This is the EU's definition of proportionality in the necessity context: Domestic Regulation:
Necessity and Transparency, WTO Doc S/WPDR/W/14 (1 May 2001) (Communication
from the European Communities and Their Member States) [17].
108 Markus Krajewski, National Regulation and Trade Liberalizationin Services (Kluwer Law
International, 2003) 143.
109 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal
Data', above n 5, 5.
110 It is a fundamental right according to the EU, and even GATS itself recognises the
importance of the objective in art XIV: see GA TS art XIV(c)(ii).
l Panel Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.432]; see also Jan Wouters and
Dominic Coppens, 'GATS and Domestic Regulation: Balancing the Right to Regulate and
Trade Liberalization' in Kern Alexander and Mads Andenas (eds), The World Trade
Organizationand Trade in Services (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 207, 218.
112 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, art 25.
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protection authorities due to the volume of daily transfers to third countries." 3
The EU will face difficulty in explaining why the administration of fourteen
country determinations is reasonable given the 149 other countries that continue
to operate in the absence of determinations. To show that the administration is
impartial, the EU must explain why countries like the Isle of Man and Jersey
underwent an adequacy determination while larger technological trading partners
like Japan, South Korea, and India have not. Whether the Privacy Directive art
25 adequacy determinations survive art VI: 1 under either test depends on the
quantum of proof the EU offers in defence of its process. Notably, however, the
difference between the tests seems to have relatively little effect on the analysis.
The Privacy Directive may also be vulnerable to an art VI:3 challenge. GA TS
art VI:3 dictates that when service suppliers are required to receive authorisation
to engage in trade, they be kept informed of their application status. Under the
Privacy Directive,data processing service suppliers must receive authorisation in
the form of an adequacy determination. To the extent that countries initially
determined to provide inadequate data protection standards remain uninformed
of opportunities to rectify that status, and countries for which no determination
has been undertaken remain uninformed of an investigation timeline, the Privacy
Directive art 25 determinations may violate GATS art VI:3.
C
1

Article XVI: MarketAccess

Introduction to Obligationson Market Access under Art XVI

The market access provisions contained in GATS art XVI are among the main
tools for liberalising trade in services used by the GA TS framework.' 14 Because
WTO member states feared liberalisation of trade in services, they agreed to
provide flexibility in market access obligations by making the requirements of
art XVI dependent upon a member's schedule of specific commitments. Article
XVI:1 imposes 'a general prohibition on according less favourable treatment to
foreign services and service suppliers than that provided for in a Member's
Schedule'. 115 Thus, the commitments in a member's schedule constitute
minimum market access guarantees.1 16 Article XVI:2 contains an exhaustive list
of six types of market access restrictions that are prohibited unless a member

113 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal
Data', above n 5, 26.
114 Panagiotis Delimatsis and Martin Molinuevo, 'Article XVI GATS: Market Access' in
Ridiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feinaugle (eds), WTO: Trade in Services
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 367, 369.
115 Ibid 371. GATSart XVI:1 reads:
With [r]espect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I,
each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less favourable than that provided for under the terms, limitations and
conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.
116 Delimatsis and Molinuevo, above n 114, 371, citing Aaditya Matoo, 'National Treatment in
the GA TS, Corner-Stone or Pandora's Box?' (1997) 31 Journal of World Trade 1, 107, 11.
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lists them in their schedule under market access.l 17 The six types of restrictions
listed in art XVI:21 8 include origin-neutral quantitative restrictions (art
XVI:2(a)-(d)),ll 9 limitations on the forms of establishment (art XVI:2(e))1 20 and
limitations on the participation of foreign capital (art XVI:2(f)). 121
In US - Gambling, Antigua argued that the US prohibition on the
cross-border supply of gambling and betting services violated the US'
commitment to provide full market access in relation to those services - as
indicated by its prescription of '[n]one' in the relevant part of its schedule - by
effectively imposing a zero quota in violation of art XIV:2(a) and XVI:2(c).122
Both the panel and the Appellate Body agreed with Antigua. Ultimately the
US - Gambling dispute set forth the following rule:
a measure prohibiting the supply of certain services where specific commitments
have been undertaken is a limitation ... within the meaning of Article XVI:2(c)
because it totally prevents the services operations and/or service output through
one or more or all means of delivery that are included in mode 1. In other words,
such a ban results in a 'zero quota' on one or more or all means of delivery
included in mode 1.123

117 UruguayRound -

Group of Negotiations on Services - Scheduling ofInitial Commitments
in Trade in Services, WTO Doc MTN.GNS/W/l64 (3 September 1993) (Explanatory Note)
[4]; Panel Report, US - Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.298]; see also Panel
Report, Mexico - Telecoms, WTO Doc WT/DS204/R, [7.357]-[7.358], [7.361]-[7.362],
confirming the exhaustive nature of the list in XVI:2 by confirming that temporal limitations
do not constitute market access limitations under that article. According to Delimatsis and
Molinuevo, the chapeau of Article XVI:2 further confirms the exhaustive nature of the list
contained therein with the statement 'that "the measures which a Member shall not maintain
or adopt ... are defined as" the measures described by lit a-f: ibid 375.
118 The chapeau of art XVI:2 reads:
In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures which a
Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional subdivision or
on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule ...
119 GATS arts XVI:2(a)-(d) read:
a)
limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements
of an economic needs test;
b)
limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of
numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
c)
limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity of
service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form of
quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
d)
limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a
particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are
necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the
form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test ...
120 GATS art XVI:2(e) reads: 'measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or
joint venture through which a service supplier may supply a service'.
121 GATS art XVI:2(f) reads: 'limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of
maximum percentage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or
aggregate foreign investment'. For the division of the list into these three categories, see
Delimatsis and Molinuevo, above n 114, 375-90.
122 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [216].
123 Ibid [252], quoting Panel Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.355].
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With regard to art XVI:2(a), the panel and Appellate Body found that a zero
quota is also 'a limitation "on the number of service suppliers in the form of
numerical quotas" within the meaning of Article XIV:2(a)'. 124
The US - Gambling dispute further affected the market access obligations in
two ways: (1) the panel set forth a theory about the relationship between arts
XVI: 1 and XVI:2 which the Appellate Body did not confirm or deny, and (2) the
responding party was held accountable for an interpretation of its schedule that it
did not support. As to the first issue, the panel intimated that art XIV:2 exhausts
the types of market access restrictions prohibited by art XIV:1.125 This
interpretation has been severely critiqued. 126 However, as the Appellate Body
neither confirmed the interpretation nor expressly overruled it, it is unclear
whether the panel interpretation or the alternative interpretations set forth by
scholars will prevail in the next market access dispute. As to the second issue,
the US - Gambling Appellate Body found that the US had scheduled specific
commitments in the gambling and betting services sector, despite the US' claims
to the contrary. 127
2

An Art XVlAnalysis of the Privacy Directive

Privacy Directive art 25 may constitute a zero quota in violation of GATS art
XVI and the market access commitments made by the EU in its schedule. The
EU's scheduled market access commitment for the data processing services
sub-sector reads '[n]one'.1 28 In other words, the EU 'has undertaken to provide
full market access, within the meaning of Article XVI, in respect of the services
included within the scope' of its commitment in relation to the data processing
services subsector, and '[i]n so doing, it has committed not to maintain any of the
types of measures listed in the six sub-paragraphs of Article XVI:2'. 129 Like the
US prohibition on the remote supply of gambling and betting services, the
Privacy Directive prohibition on cross-border transfers of personal data to
inadequate third countries is vulnerable to a zero quota challenge. A prohibition
on transfers to the hypothetical complainant Australia, for example, represents a
'[limitation] on the number of service suppliers ... in the form of [a] numerical
[quota]' under art XVI:2(a), 130 and a '[limitation] on the total number of service
operations or on the total quantity of service output ... in the form of [a] [quota]'
under art XVI:2(c)131 as regards Australian services suppliers. 132

124 Panel Report, US - Gambling, WTO Doc
(citations omitted).
125 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO
126 Delimatsis and Molinuevo, above n 114, 390-2
127 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO
128 EU Schedule, WTO Doc GATS/SC/31, 32.
129 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO
130 GATS art XVI:2(a).
131 lbid art XVI(2)(c).

WT/DS285/R, [6.338]; ibid [216], [257]
Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [6.298].
Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [213].
Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [215].
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THE UNPREDICTABILITY OF GATS ART XIV EXCEPTIONS ANALYSIS: A
THREAT TO EU PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY?

When trade in services was placed on the Uruguay Round negotiating agenda,
one of the key concerns of WTO member states was that GATS would unduly
interfere with the sovereign ability of members to implement domestic social
policy. 133 Unsurprisingly, the original drafters of General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1947 ('GATT 1947')134 had similar concerns and included art XX,

entitled General Exceptions, to allow states to implement measures that would
otherwise be GATT-inconsistent if undertaken when necessary to 'protect public
morals',1 35 'protect human, animal or plant life or health', 136 or secure
compliance with WTO-consistent laws and regulations, 137 among other reasons.
Similarly, GATS contains art XIV, entitled General Exceptions. Modelled after
GATT art XX,138 GATS art XIV provides exceptions for measures undertaken
when necessary to: 'protect public morals or ... maintain public order',139 and
'protect human, animal or plant life or health'.1 40 Because the '[r]egulation of
services does not respond to exactly the same needs as the regulation of
goods',141 GATS art XIV specifically provides for measures relating to the

132 At this juncture, it is appropriate to note that there exists a debate in the literature regarding
whether a WTO member's schedule should be interpreted as a unilateral act or as the
common intention of all the WTO members. Testing the debate with the Privacy Directive,
it becomes apparent that either interpretation provides identical results - the Privacy
Directive governs data processing services, which fall under the computer services sector in
the 1(B)(c) heading of W120: W/120, WTO Doc MTN.GNS/W/120, 2. The common
intention of the parties is reflected in the fact that data processing is specifically listed as
part of the computer sector, and specified as being part of CPC 843, which under the CPC
falls under the computer-related services sector. The unilateral intention of the EU confirms
that this is the appropriate classification, given that the EU specifically recognises that
online data processing is part of the computer services sector: EC Telecom Classification,
WTO Doc TN/S/W/27/S/CSC/W/44. Thus, with regard to the Privacy Directive, an
application of both the unilateral interpretation of the schedule and the 'common
understanding' interpretation of the schedule results in the EU committing to a listing of
'none' with regard to data processing. While not every context in which this issue arises will
arrive at the same result, this author proposes that detailed case-by-case analysis of the
appropriate interpretive method is more appropriate than applying either the common
understanding or unilateral act approach across the board because upon further examination,
as here, many of these issues will dissolve into non-issues.
133 Geza Feketekuty, 'Trade in Professional Services: An Overview' (1986) 1 University of
Chicago Legal Forum 1, 4 ('The argument for free service trade is not an argument for the
non-observance of local regulations designed to protect the public'); see generally
Delimatsis, above n 37, 85, noting that GATS 'aims to minimize the negative trade effects of
all governmental regulatory barriers, while preserving Members' right to regulate their
economies to meet legitimate national policy objectives'. This is also reflected in the dual
aims of GATS.
134 Opened for signature 30 October 1947, 55 UNTS 194 (entered into force 1 January 1948)
('GA TT 1947').
135 Ibid art XX(a).
136 Ibid art XX(b).
137 Ibid art XX(d).
138 Thomas Cottier, Panagiotis Delimatsis and Nicolas F Diebold, 'Article XIV GATS: General
Exceptions' in Ridiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Clemens Feiniiugle (eds), WTO:
Trade In Services (Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) 287, 290.
139 GA TS art XIV(a).
140 Ibid art XIV(b).
141 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 292.
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protection of fair competition, 142 privacy,1 43 and taxationl44 while GATT art XX
does not. Nevertheless, when interpreting GA TS art XIV, the Appellate Body in
US - Gambling used the traditional GATT exceptions analysis, which requires
that the measure be undertaken for one of the enumerated purposes, be
necessary, and satisfy the requirements of the chapeau. In doing so, the Appellate
Body tightened the flexible policy space available for creating WTO-compliant
regulatory schemes that also protect fundamental rights.
A

An Introductionto Exceptions Analysis in the WTO

General exceptions analysis under GATS follows a two-tiered approach.1 45
First, the measure must '[fall] within the scope of one of the paragraphs of
Article XIV'.14 6 To satisfy this first tier of analysis, the measure must both have
been undertaken for one of the enumerated purposes and the measure must have
the 'required nexus ... between the measure and the interest' designated by the
term 'necessary to'. 147 Then, under the second tier, the measure must satisfy the
requirements of the chapeau.148 There are two main critiques of this analysis,
both of which are heightened concerns in the GATS context: the analysis of the
term 'necessary' and the use of the chapeau.
1

CritiquesofExceptions Analysis: The UnpredictableNecessity Test

In US - Gambling, the only WTO dispute to fully address a claim under
GATS art XIV, the Appellate Body stated 'at the outset, that the standard of
"necessity" provided for in the general exceptions provision is an objective
standard'.149 The Appellate Body then described the necessity analysis as a
'weighing and balancing' test which ultimately looked to 'whether a
WTO-consistent alternative measure which the member concerned could
"reasonably be expected to employ" is available, or whether a less
WTO-inconsistent measure is "reasonably available"'. 50 The first step in the
weighing and balancing is 'an assessment of the "relative importance" of the
interests or values furthered by the challenged measure'. 151 The Appellate Body
then determines two additional factors: 'the contribution of the measure to the
realisation of the ends pursued by it; [and] the restrictive impact of the measure
on international commerce'. 152 The latter two factors should also be determined
for the possible alternatives offered by the complainant as more
WTO-compliant. 153 These factors should then be compared between the
142 GATS art XIV(c)(i).
143 Ibid art XIV(c)(ii).
144 Ibid art XIV(d)-(e).

145 Appellate Body Report, US146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.

Gambling,WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [292].

148 Ibid.
149 Ibid [304].

150 Ibid [305], quoting Appellate Body Report, Korea -

WT/DS169/AB/R, [166].
151 Ibid [306].
152 Ibid.

153 Ibid [307].

Beef WTO Doc WT/DSl61/AB/R,
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challenged measure and the proposed alternative measures, in light of the
importance of the interests underlying the challenged measure. 154 The weighing
and balancing occurs at this point, when comparing the measures and taking into
account the interests at stake. 55 In the end, the necessity test can be summed up
as a requirement 'that there be no "reasonably available" WTO-consistent
alternative'. 156
This description of the necessity test was wholly imported by the Appellate
Body from the GATT context, specifically relying on Korea - Beef The
Appellate Body imported the GATT necessity test after confirming the panel's
decision that GATT art XX jurisprudence is relevant in the GATS art XIV
context because of the 'textual and conceptual similarities between the
two provisions', 157 and the encouragement from the Appellate Body in
EC - BananasIII to use GA TTjurisprudence in adjudicating GA TS claims when
'the obligations are essentially of the same type'. 158 Just prior to the Appellate
Body's decision in US - Gambling, however, the WTO Working Party on
Domestic Regulations strongly warned against this very type of wholesale
importation of the necessity test, stating:
each WTO provision was to be interpreted in its proper context, and in light of the
object and purpose of the relevant agreement, in spite of some similarities
between the different provisions containing necessity tests. In other words, it was
not possible to automatically assume that an interpretation of a necessity test in
159
one agreement might be transferable to another agreement.
The Working Party's warning reflects long standing practice within WTO
jurisprudence. For example, when interpreting GATT art XX exceptions, the
Appellate Body in US - Gasoline stated that each paragraph may call for
different level of 'necessity'. 160 Furthermore, the Appellate Body in
Mexico - Soft Drinks overruled the panel's interpretation of GATT art XX(d)
because the panel improperly based its interpretation on the US - Gambling
interpretation of GATS art XIV(a). 16 1 The Appellate Body deemed such reliance

improper because the US - Gambling interpretation of 'necessary' occurred in a
context wholly different than that at issue in the Mexico - Soft Drinks case. 162
The fact that the US - Gambling panel and Appellate Body ignored the
strong warning of the WTO Secretariat and broke with prior Appellate Body
decisions to keep GATT and GA TS necessity test interpretation separate is likely
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid.

156 Ibid [308]. It is said that the stringency of this standard 'reflects the shared understanding of
Members that substantive GA TS obligations should not be deviated from lightly'.
157 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 292-3, citing Panel Report, US- Gambling,
WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.448]; Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling, WTO Doc
WT/DS285/AB/R, [291].
158 Ibid, citing Appellate Body Report, EC- BananasIll, WTO Doc WT/DS27/AB/R, [231].
159 Report on the Meeting Held on 3 December 2003, WTO Doc S/WPDR/M/24 (22 January
2004) (Note by the Secretariat) [41]; see also Secretariat Note on Article XX, WTO Doc
WT/CTE/W/53/Rev. 1.
160 Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (29 April 1996) 17-8 ('US- Gasoline').
161 Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages,
WTO Doc WT/DS308/AB/R, AB-2005-10 (6 March 2006) [74] ('Mexico - Soft Drinks').
162 Ibid.
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to have a negative impact on one of the twin aims of GATS: the preservation of
WTO members' right to enact domestic regulations designed to protect important
social interests. In particular, '[t]he examination of whether or not a measure is
"necessary" ... has proved to be a crucial step in panel practice', as many
measures pursuing one of the legitimate aims of the general exceptions article
fail the necessity test, depriving the WTO member of their right to regulate in
areas of important social concern. 163 Some scholars, however, defend the
necessity test as 'a flexible concept that, if applied properly, may protect rather
than curtail regulatory diversity'.1 64 For example, Thomas Cottier, Panagiotis
Delimatsis and Nicolas F Diebold argue that flexibility is built into the test in
connection to the importance of the value pursued by the measure, and contend
that decisions such as EC - Asbestos demonstrate that a value such as the
protection of human life and health which is 'vital and important in the highest
degree' can justify a total prohibition that prevents life-threatening health
risks. 165 Ultimately, perhaps, only future application of GATS art XIV can
demonstrate whether the necessity test imported from GA TT jurisprudence truly
is flexible enough to uphold the twin aims of GATS, or if, as is so often the case
in the GATT context, measures will routinely fail for lack of necessity. An
in-depth analysis of the Privacy Directive under GATS art XIV provides one
avenue for testing the necessity test critique.
2

Critiques of the Appellate Body's Use of the Chapeau

The general exceptions provisions of both GATT and GA TS contain a chapeau
that imposes substantive obligations. These additional obligations 'seek to ensure
that rights granted to derogate from WTO obligations to achieve non-economic
policy goals are not applied in an abusive manner'. 166 Although the panel in
US - Gambling did not need to interpret the chapeau in order to settle the
dispute, it provided an interpretation in order 'to assist the parties in resolving the
underlying dispute'. 167 In doing so, the panel endorsed the use of the Appellate
Body's prior interpretations of GATT art XX chapeau analysis as the basis for
GATS art XIV chapeau analysis.1 68 The Appellate Body did not overturn or
correct the panel's use of GATTjurisprudence to interpret GA TS art XIV.169
The Appellate Body generally reads the chapeau as containing three
prohibitions: 'first, arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail; second, unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail; and third, a disguised restriction on international

163 SecretariatNote on Article XX, WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/53/Rev.1, [42].
164 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 316.
165 Ibid, citing Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc WT/DSl35/AB/R, AB-2000-l1 [172]
('EC- Asbestos').
166 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 321.
167 Panel Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.566].
168 See ibid [6.571]; see also Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 321.
169 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [338]-[369].
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trade'. 170 These standards are cumulative in nature. 171 In seeking to justify a
measure under the chapeau the respondent must demonstrate both that the
measure is not discriminatory on its face and that it is applied consistently as
between domestic and foreign suppliers.1 72 The respondent may establish these
facts with evidence regarding the overall number of service suppliers and the
patterns of enforcement.173
Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold critique the Appellate Body for analysing
measures 'without developing generally applicable and abstract rules', despite
the frequency with which it engages in interpreting the chapeau.1 74 As a result,
'the WTO adjudicating bodies have a wide discretion when applying these
elements'.1 75 The Appellate Body's approach to the chapeau seems to emphasise
providing the WTO DSB with flexibility in upholding the object and purpose of
the chapeau - the prevention of abuse of the exceptions. 176 Unfortunately, the
wide discretion given to the panel and the Appellate Body in making such
determinations results in WTO members' reduced ability to predict the outcome
of the application of the chapeau to any given measure.
B

The Privacy Directive as a GATS-Excepted Measure

The Privacy Directive was undertaken for the purpose of safeguarding
'fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy'.' 77 Prior to the
Appellate Body decision in US - Gambling, scholars noted that the GATS
general exceptions specifically provide for privacy concerns and assumed that

170 Appellate Body Report, US - Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 22; see ibid [339].
With regard to arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination, a measure will fail the scrutiny of
the chapeau if it does not satisfy each of the elements of the following test from
US - Shrimp: 'the application of the measure (i) results in discrimination (ii) which is
arbitrary or unjustifiable in character and (iii) occurs between countries where like
conditions prevail': Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 322 (emphasis altered)
(citing Appellate Body Report, US - Shrimp, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R, [150];
Appellate Body Report, US - Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, 23; Panel Report,
US - Gambling WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.578]). With regard to a disguised restriction
on trade, WTO jurisprudence interpreting this standard is generally lacking, however the
Appellate Body has provided several guidelines: (1) 'disguised trade restriction' is a term
covering arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination as well as other measures: ibid 25; (2)
concealed or unannounced restrictions can constitute a disguised restriction on trade:
Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 325; see also SecretariatNote on Article XX,
WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/53/Rev.1, [22]; (3) a measure will be found abusive under this
standard of the chapeau if it 'is in fact only a disguise to conceal the pursuit of
trade-restrictive objectives [not listed in GA TT art XX]': Panel Report, EC - Asbestos,
WTO Doc WT/DS135/R (18 September 2000) [8.236].
171 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [339].
172 Ibid [351].
173 Ibid [357].
174 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 322.
175 Ibid 323.
176 See SecretariatNote on Article XX, WTO Doc WT/CTE/W/53/Rev. 1, [22]; see also ibid
323 ('[T]he WTO adjudicating bodies have wide discretion when applying these elements').
177 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, Preamble para 2.
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the Privacy Directive would qualify under GATS art XIV(c)(ii). 178 However, the
US - Gambling case revealed that even when a measure is found to be
undertaken for a purpose specifically enumerated in the GATS exceptions, it may
nevertheless fail to comply with other requirements of art XIV. 179 The Privacy
Directive thus provides a useful test case for uncovering the ability of GATS art
XIV to protect fundamental rights given the recent jurisprudence. In order to
satisfy the first tier of exceptions analysis, the Privacy Directive must have been
undertaken for the purpose of 'the protection of the privacy of individuals'
within the meaning of art XIV(c)(ii), and be 'necessary' for the privacy
protection. Secondly, the Privacy Directive must be found to be consistent with
the chapeau.
1

Securing Compliance under GATS Art XIV(c)(ii)

The first prong of the exceptions analysis requires a determination that the
challenged measure addresses, or is designed to address, 'the particular interest
of the relevant paragraph'.1so In order to address the particular interest contained
in GATS art XIV(c)(ii), the Privacy Directive must both 'secure compliance'
with other laws and regulations designed to protect individual privacy in data
processing, and those other 'laws or regulations' must be GATS-consistent. 18 1 In
other words, the Privacy Directive must 'relate directly to [laws or regulations]
which [are themselves] GA TS-consistent'. 182
In Mexico - Soft Drinks, the Appellate Body held that 'laws and regulations'
means:
rules that form part of the domestic legal system of a WTO member, including
rules deriving from international agreements that have been incorporated into the
domestic legal system of a WTO member or have direct effect according to that
183
WTO member's legal system.
The EU enacted the Privacy Directive in order to harmonise the data
protection law of its member states. 184 As such, the Privacy Directive provisions
on processing personal data set forth 'a basic structure, with more or less detailed
178 Shaffer, 'Globalization and Social Protection', above n 8, 50-2. Furthermore, Shaffer makes
predictions about the way the Privacy Directive will comply with the rest of GATS art XIV
requirements without the benefits of the last eight years of development of adequacy
procedures and determinations by the Working Party and the European Commission. The
new information about the details of the EU adequacy regime calls for a new, more
thorough analysis of art XIV.
179 Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [369] (concluding
that the US measures do not satisfy the requirements of the chapeau).
180 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 295 (citing Appellate Body Report,
Mexico - Soft Drinks, WTO Doc WT/DS308/AB/R, [72]; Appellate Body Report,
US-Shrimp, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R, [116]).
181 Panel Report, US - Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.538]; see also Panel Report,
US- Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/R, [6.33].
182 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 307.
183 Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Soft Drinks, WTO Doc WT/DS308/AB/R, [79].
184 Schwartz, above n 7, 481 n 69 ('The Directive speaks of the need for "Community action to
approximate" the data protection law of Member States. ... The notions of the
"approximation" and "harmonization" of national law are synonymous'); see also Privacy
Directive [1995] OJ L 281/31, Preamble; see generally George A Bermann et al, Cases and
Materialson European Community Law (West Publishing, 1993) 430.
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provisions, to which Member States must conform'.185 In this way, the binding
obligation contained in Privacy Directive art 25 to prohibit data transfers to
inadequate third countries enforces the laws of EU member states protecting
individual privacy in data processing. Because of their specific mention in GATS
art XIV(c)(ii), laws and regulations protecting individual privacy with relation to
data processing are considered GATS-consistent per se.186 Thus, the national data
protection laws and regulations of EU member states constitute 'other' laws and
regulations that are GATS-consistent - satisfying the initial requirement of
GATS art XIV(c)(ii).
The Privacy Directive must now be analysed under the 'securing compliance'
portion of GA TS art XIV(c)(ii). WTO jurisprudence makes clear that in order for
the challenged measure to be seen as securing compliance with other laws and
regulations, it must 'enforce "obligations" contained in the laws and regulations
and not merely ensure achievement of the goals of those laws and
regulations'.187 Thus, to come within the art XIV(c) enforcement exception, art
25 of the Privacy Directive must aim at enforcing the obligations of other
WTO-consistent laws and regulations protecting the privacy of individuals in
relation to the processing of personal data. The Working Party has stated that the
purpose of the art 25 prohibition on transfers of data to third countries with
inadequate data protection is to prevent circumvention or abuse of the privacy
protection laws instituted by EU member states pursuant to the Privacy
Directive.188 The adequacy determinations analyse the law of third countries
with the aim of discerning whether it contains the minimum requirements for the
protection of individual privacy with relation to data processing.189 The
adequacy requirement thus seeks meaningful enforcement of the obligations of
data protection laws of EU member states conforming to the processing
requirements of the Privacy Directive. As such, Privacy Directive art 25 is a
measure designed to secure compliance with other GATS-consistent laws and
regulations.
2

The Privacy Directive and the Necessity Test

Having determined that Privacy Directive art 25 is designed to address the
particular interest of securing compliance with other GATS-consistent laws and
regulations protecting individual privacy in data processing, the next inquiry
under exceptions analysis is whether Privacy Directive art 25 is 'necessary' to
achieve that interest. The Appellate Body has interpreted the term 'necessary'

185 Bermann et al, above n 184, 430.
186 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 306-7.
187 Ibid 307 (citing Panel Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/R, [6.538]; Appellate
Body Report, US - Gasoline, WTO Doc WT/DS2/AB/R, [6.33]).
188 See Peter J Hustinx, 'European Data Protection Supervisor, Adequate Protection - Opinion
6/99 of the Article 29 Working Party Revisited' in Attila Pdterfalvi (ed), Ten Years ofDP &
FO1 Commissioner's Office (The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Data
Protection and Freedom of Information, 2006) 251, 252.
189 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive', above n 10.
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three times in the GATT general exceptions context, 190 and once in the GATS
general exceptions context. 191 As the only definition of 'necessary' under GA TS
relates to a provision wholly different from the protection of privacy and
personal data, a preliminary issue in the analysis of the Privacy Directive under
art XIV(c)(ii) requires a determination of whether the term 'necessary' should be
given the same meaning as it retains in art XIV(a).
The answer to this inquiry lies within the US - Gambling analysis itself.
First, it is noteworthy that GA TT art XX(a) has never been interpreted.192
Instead, the Appellate Body in US - Gambling imported the 'necessary' test
from Korea - Beef which dealt with GA TT art XX(d), the provision for
securing compliance with other WTO-consistent laws.193 Notably, GATS art
XIV(c) is the GA TS provision on securing compliance with otherwise
WTO-consistent laws, and art XIV(c)(ii) simply specifies that laws relating to
the privacy in data processing are among those falling under art XIV(c). 194 It
thus seems logical that if the term 'necessary' retains its meaning in the public
moral exception, it certainly retains its meaning in the enforcement exception
provision, the very type of provision for which the analysis was originally
created. The fact that GATT does not contain a specific provision on privacy in
data processing does not alter the meaning of 'necessary' as it relates to
measures which 'secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement', 195 but rather reflects the fact
that the types of social regulation which might otherwise interfere with the trade
in goods, namely those relating to customs enforcement, monopolies, intellectual
property, and deceptive trade practices, are not the same as those which might
otherwise interfere with an agreement on trade in services, namely deception and
fraud in service contracts and privacy protection in data processing.
Having established that it is appropriate to use the US - Gambling necessity
test for GATS art XIV(a) in an analysis of GATS art XIV(c), the issue becomes
whether the Privacy Directive survives it. Under the weighing and balancing test
of US - Gambling, an analysis of the Privacy Directive begins by identifying
the relative importance of the interest it is designed to protect: individual privacy
with relation to data protection. The EU understands the right to privacy as

190 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Beef WTO Doc WTIDSl61/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R;
Appellate Body Report, EC - Asbestos, WTO Doc WT/DSl35/AB/R; Appellate Body
Report, Dominican Republic - Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of
Cigarettes, WTO Doc WT/DS302/AB/R, AB-2005-3 (25 April 2005) ('Dominican
Republic - Cigarettes').
191 Appellate Body Report, US- Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R.
192 John H Jackson, William J Davey and Alan 0 Sykes Jr, Legal Problems of International
Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International
Regulation of TransnationalEconomic Relations (Thompson West, 5"' ed, 2008) 592.
193 Appellate Body Report, US - Gambling, WTO Doc WT/DS285/AB/R, [305]; see also
Korea- Beef WTO Doc WT/DS169/AB/R, [157]-[172].
194 GATS art XIV(c).
195 Ibid; GA 7T 1947 art XX(d).
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one of a person's 'fundamental rights and freedoms'. 196 Furthermore, the
InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights states that '[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy', 197 and the
United Nations considers privacy in personal data of sufficient importance to
issue Guidelines concerning ComputerizedData Files.198 In this way, individual
privacy with relation to personal data is an interest of relatively great importance.
Next, the weighing and balancing test requires an inquiry into (1) the extent to
which PrivacyDirective art 25 actually secures compliance with laws protecting
privacy in the realm of data processing, and (2) the impact Privacy Directive art
25 imposes on international trade in computer-services. As to the first element,
the prohibition on data transfers to inadequate third countries seeks to prevent
circumvention of the data processing principles embodied in the rest of the
Privacy Directive.199 The Privacy Directive contemplates that adequacy
determinations would be made on a case-by-case basis for individual transfers or
groups of transfers. 200 Unfortunately, the computer-services sector has grown
significantly since the adoption of the Directive so that no member state is
capable of individually analysing each transfer of data from their borders. 201 This
is especially the case because the Working Party has interpreted the scope of the
Directive to include a broad variety of data under the heading of personal
data - everything from generally agreed upon data, such as names and phone
numbers, to more controversial data, such as IP addresses. 202 As a result, the EU
turned to the use of general adequacy decisions. However, only fourteen such
decisions have been made, giving eleven nations a finding of adequacy, two,
Canada and the US (through the Safe HarborAgreement) an adequacy finding in
certain sectors, and one, Australia, an inadequacy finding. This leaves EU
member states without guidance on 149 countries with which computer-services
trade continues on a daily basis. Whereas EU member states do not transfer data
to Australia based on the general inadequacy finding, they are left to attempt

196 Privacy Directive [1995] OJ L 281/3 1, Preamble para 2; see also Convention for the
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, opened
for signature 28 January 1981, ETS No 108 (entered into force 1 October 1985)
Preamble -art 1:
Considering that it is desirable to extend the safeguards for everyone's rights and
fundamental freedoms, and in particular the right to the respect for privacy, taking
account of the increasing flow across frontiers of personal data undergoing automatic
processing ... [art 1] The purpose of this convention is to secure in the territory of
each Party for every individual, whatever his nationality or residence, respect for his
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy, with regard to
automatic processing of personal data relating to him ('data protection').
197 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December
1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 17.
198 Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteur, Revised Version of the Guidelinesfor the Regulation of
Computerized Data Files, UN ESCOR, 46th sess, Agenda Item 14, UN Doc E/CN.4/1990/72
(20 February 1990).
199 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Transfers of Personal Data to Third Countries:
Applying Articles 25 and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive', above n 10, 5.
200 Ibid 26.
201 Ibid.

202 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal
Data', above n 5, 6-24; see also Cutler and Reyes, above n 50.
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individual assessments of transfers to the 154 other countries, any number of
which could also have inadequate standards of data protection.
As to the second element, findings of inadequacy have a generally negative
impact on trade. For example, those entities in the computer-services sector not
covered by the US Safe Harbor Agreement, the computer-services sector in
Australia, and the computer-services sectors in Canada not engaged in
commercial activities are each forbidden from receiving data transfers from EU
member states. As a result, businesses in these countries face higher costs of
business and constrained business opportunities. 203 Furthermore, inadequacy
findings tend to increase transaction costs of seeking information that would be
readily available in the absence of such a finding, and reduces business
productivity when the information is not available through other means. 204
The next step in the US - Gambling analysis of the term 'necessary' is to
identify alternative measures that are more consistent with GATS. First, the
Privacy Directive could have provided for restricted data transfers to inadequate
third countries, rather than imposing a full prohibition. In fact, the Organisation
for Economic Co-Operation and Development ('OECD') issued Guidelines on
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data in 1980,
which instructs OECD members to only restrict, rather than prohibit, data flows
to third countries when seeking to enforce domestic privacy legislation. 205
Second, the Privacy Directive could have provided a lower standard than that of
'adequacy' to determine when data transfers to third countries should be
prohibited, so as not to unduly burden international computer-services trade. It
has been suggested that although the Privacy Directive calls for 'adequacy' of
data protection in third countries, it really seeks 'equivalency' of EU data
protection in third countries. 206 This is borne out in the EU-US trans-border data
flow context, where transfers to the US only take place under the Safe Harbor
Agreement, which the EU negotiated to provide equivalent standards. 207 In
comparison to this stringent definition and application of 'adequacy', the
Guidelines concerning Computerized Personal Data Files use a standard of
'comparable safeguards for the protection of privacy' when contemplating the
appropriateness of data transfers to third countries. 208 A third less
trade-restrictive alternative is to require computer-services technologies
themselves to use technical solutions to '[incorporate] data protection within the
infrastructure's architecture'. 209 The idea is that technical solutions may
themselves 'arbitrate divergences in national laws'. 2 10 The Working Party
203 Shaffer, 'The Power of EU Collective Action', above n 57, 433.
204 Shaffer, 'Globalization and Social Protection', above n 8, 18.
205 Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and TransborderFlows of Personal Data (23 September 1980) Organisation for
Economic Co-Operation and Development [17] <http://www.oecd.org/document/
18/0,3343,en 2649_34255_1815186_1 1 _1,00.html>.
206 David Raj Nijhawan, 'The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the European
Union Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States' (2003) 56 Vanderbilt Law
Review 939, 954; but see Schwartz, above n 7, 483-8.
207 See Safe HarborAgreement, above n 28.
208 Joinet, above n 198, 3.
209 Joel R Reidenberg, 'Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace'
(2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 1315, 1356.
210 Ibid.
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recognised this possibility on two occasions. 211 Some suggest that the World
Wide Web Consortium's 'Platform for Privacy Preferences' initiative 212 could be
used to enforce data protection law 'if server-based filtering can be used to
identify and protect against deviations from a jurisdiction's mandatory rules'. 213
A second proposal for using technology to enforce data protection law is to use
intelligent agents 'to protect against the secondary use of stored personal
information'. 2 14 In this way, the technology used to transfer data across borders
could itself be used to bridge the gap between the EU and inadequate third
countries, a less trade restrictive alternative than prohibiting the transfers
altogether.
Under the weighing and balancing test, the 'restrict' rather than 'prohibit'
option will alter the balance with regard to the negative impact on trade, while
the 'comparable' rather than 'adequate/equivalent' standard will alter the balance
with regard to both the extent to which the Privacy Directive secures
enforcement and the negative impact on trade. Similarly, using technology itself
to enforce data protection laws would both increase compliance and decrease the
impact on international trade in computer-services. An Appellate Body
examining the issue may very well determine that the Privacy Directive fails to
achieve the appropriate nexus to the securing enforcement interest in GATS art
XIV(c) because it is not 'necessary' in light of other less GATS-inconsistent
measures which would better achieve compliance and have less negative trade
impact. On the other hand, the Appellate Body generally defers to a member
state's determination that a particular level of compliance with other laws and
regulations is 'necessary', 2 15 and may find the Privacy Directive's adequacy
211 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal
Data, 'Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and Automatic Processing of Personal Data on
the Internet Performed by Software and Hardware' (Recommendation WP 17, European
Commission, 23 February 1999); Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 'Opinion 1/98:
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and the Open Profiling Standard (OPS)' (Report WP
11, European Commission, 16 June 1998).
212 The World Wide Web Consortium, The Platform for Privacy Preferences 1.0 (P3PL.0)
Specification (2 November 1999) The World Wide Web Consortium ('W3C')
<www.w3.org/TR/I 999/WD-P3P-1 9991102>.
213 Reidenberg, above n 209, 1356-7, citing Working Party on the Protection of Individuals
with regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 'Recommendation 1/99 on Invisible and
Automatic Processing of Personal Data on the Internet Performed by Software and
Hardware', above n 211; Joel R Reidenberg, 'The Use of Technology to Assure Internet
Privacy: Adapting Labels and Filters for Data Protection' (1997) 3 Lex Electronica
<http://www.lex-electronica.orglarticles/v3-2/reidenbe.html>.
214 Reidenberg, above n 209, 1357, citing International Working Group on Data Protection in
Telecommunications, 'Common Position on Intelligent Software Agents' (Common
Position, International Working Group on Data Protection in Telecommunications, 29 April
1999); J J Borking, BMA van Eck and P Siepel, 'Intelligent Software Agents: Turning a
Privacy Threat into a Privacy Protector' (Joint Report, Ontario Information and Privacy
Commissioner and Netherlands Registratiekamer, 1999) <http://www.ipc.on.calimages/
Resources/up-isat.pdf>.
215 Donald H Regan, 'The Meaning of "Necessary" in GATT Article XX and GATS Article
XIV: The Myth of Cost-Benefit Balancing' (2007) 6 World Trade Review 347, 348. Regan
argues that although subsequent Appellate Body reports pay lip-service to the official Korea
- Beef weighing and balancing test, they generally follow another statement set forth by the
Appellate Body in Korea - Beef 'the principle that a Member pursuing some legitimate
domestic goal is entitled to choose for itself the level of achievement of that goal', citing
Appellate Body Report, Korea - Beef WTO Doc WT/DSl61/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R,
[176], [178].
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provisions are necessary to secure compliance, despite evidence to the
contrary. 2 16 As a result, this analysis next turns to the fate of the Privacy
Directive under the chapeau.
3

The Privacy Directive under the Chapeau

If the Privacy Directive satisfies the necessity test, the EU would next be
required to demonstrate that the Privacy Directive art 25 adequacy
determinations do not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or
impose a disguised restriction on trade, To overcome the first hurdle of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination the EU must demonstrate that Privacy Directive
art 25 is not applied in such a way that '(i) results in discrimination (ii) which
is arbitrary or unjustifiable in character and (iii) occurs between countries
where like conditions prevail'. 217 Privacy Directive art 25 is applied through
country adequacy determinations. The adequacy determinations do result in
discrimination, as transfer of personal data to service suppliers from some
countries (such as Australia) is prohibited, while transfer of personal data to
service suppliers in other countries (such as the US, Canada and South Korea)
continues despite an adverse adequacy determination or in the absence of any
determination at all. The question then becomes, under the second element,
whether the discrimination is arbitrary or unjustifiable.
The second prong may be applied differently depending on the circumstances.
The discrimination which occurs as between Australia and Canada, for example,
is neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable, as it is a result of increased efforts by
Canada to reach partial-adequacy which were not undertaken by Australia.
Demonstrating, on the other hand, that the discrimination between Australia and
the US is neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable, will prove more difficult. The EU
must demonstrate why the Safe HarborAgreement negotiated with the US was
not similarly offered to Australia. That agreements were negotiated with some
WTO members while the art 25 prohibition was unilaterally applied to other
WTO members without negotiation resembles the circumstances in
US - Shrimp where the US 'unilaterally applied its import prohibition without
engaging in negotiations with some members, while it did with others'. 218 The
Appellate Body felt that such action served to 'heighten the disruptive and
discriminatory influence of the import prohibition and underscore its
unjustifiability'. 219 Perhaps the most difficult challenge for the EU will lie in
proving that the daily transfer of personal data to service suppliers in countries
such as South Korea, which have not undergone any adequacy determination
whatsoever, does not render the adverse adequacy determinations issued to other
countries arbitrary and unjustifiable. This type of discrimination resembles the
action by the US in affording countries different amounts of time for compliance

216 In fact, it has been argued that the Appellate Body has precisely done this in each of its
decisions to interpret and apply the term 'necessary': Korea - Beef EC - Asbestos,
US - Gambling, and Dominican Republic - Cigarettes;see generally ibid.
217 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 322.
218 Ibid 323.
219 Appellate Body Report, US -Shrimp, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R, [172].
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with the measure in US - Shrimp, which according to the Appellate Body,
constituted unjustifiable discrimination. 220
As to the third prong, discrimination does occur between countries where like
conditions prevail - the US, Canada and Australia were all given generally
inadequate determinations, and countries for which no determination has been
undertaken should be presumed inadequate until determined otherwise. As a
result, Privacy Directive art 25 determinations would likely be found to result in
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions
prevail, rendering them incompatible with a strict reading of the chapeau's
requirements.
On the other hand, the Appellate Body has given itself wide discretion in the
application of the requirements of the chapeau by refusing to create a generally
applicable standard and insisting on a case-by-case analysis. Given this level of
unpredictability, it remains conceivable that because the Privacy Directive art 25
adequacy determinations are designed to protect such a fundamental right as
privacy in personal data that it will not be construed as a violation of the GA TS
art XIV chapeau. Given that the twin aims of GATS specifically reserve the right
of WTO members to regulate important domestic social interests while
simultaneously undertaking to liberalise trade in services, the EU should not be
forced to risk forfeiture of an important and elaborate regulatory scheme at the
discretion of the Appellate Body in applying the chapeau. The EU, along with
the other WTO member nations, negotiated GA TS with the expectation of
predictability in obligations. While the analysis of the Privacy Directive under
the chapeau points to a clear prediction of incompatibility, the discretion
reserved to the Appellate Body in this area renders the prediction less than
concrete, undermining the usefulness of GA TS art XIV as a tool for WTO
members in balancing trade obligations with important domestic regulatory
prerogatives and agendas.
V

CONCLUSION: LESSONS IN WTO-COMPLIANT PROTECTION OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

An analysis of the Privacy Directive under GA TS uncovered that although
GA TS obligations are generally clear and understandable, even in the new and
complex context of internet-based services, the possibility that any given
measure will withstand GATS exceptions analysis is unpredictable, no matter
how important the value pursued by the measure in question. The Privacy
Directive, for example, seeks to protect a fundamental right to privacy. Arguably
the EU knew that Privacy Directive art 25 adequacy determinations might
violate their GATS obligations, especially given the specific commitments made
in the computer-services sub-sector. In deciding to protect a fundamental right,
however, the EU is entitled, per the terms of GA TS itself, to rely on the general
exceptions in art XIV, which even specifically provide for measures securing
compliance with laws designed to protect privacy in personal data.
Unfortunately, the latitude given to the WTO DSB in interpreting the general
exceptions may allow a challenge to the Privacy Directive to overcome the EU's
reliance on GATS art XIV(c)(ii). Ultimately, despite GATS' promise to reserve
220 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, above n 138, 323.
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WTO members' right to create domestic regulatory schemes protecting
important social interests, the application of the main provision preserving that
right, the GATS art XIV general exceptions, is rendered unpredictable by the
necessity test and the chapeau, leaving members in the very position that caused
concern early in negotiations - that GATS obligations could inhibit their ability
to protect important domestic interests, such as the fundamental right to privacy
in personal data.
The case study of the Privacy Directive hints at some important lessons
for policymakers in WTO member countries attempting to protect certain
fundamental rights through the regulation of service industries. In particular, it
will be important that, unlike the initial students of the Privacy Directive,
policymakers recognise that reliance on a purpose specifically enumerated in art
XIV does not guarantee justification of the measure under that provision. An
in-depth analysis of necessity and the chapeau must be undertaken before a WTO
member country can be even cautiously confident that the regulatory scheme is
WTO-consistent. Additionally, the PrivacyDirective case study reveals that even
a regulatory scheme that is facially WTO-consistent when enacted can mutate
into a WTO-inconsistent measure if the implementing agency fails to consider
the effects of their chosen method of application of the measure on international
trade obligations. To protect fundamental rights with a WTO-consistent
regulatory scheme, policymakers must be attentive to international trade
obligations both during the enactment of the legislation and throughout the life of
the program.

